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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to evaluate whether the provision of non-audit services (NASs) affects external 
auditor independence in an environment characterised by low legal protection of minority 
investors and a high concentration of ownership and control. Audit reports and costs of services 
are analysed over 3 years for 154 Brazilian companies. The binary variable proxy for 
independence indicates a qualified auditor's report and, as an alternative specification, the 
issuing of a going concern opinion. Logit models were employed with control variables to 
identify aspects related to other sources of threats to independence, management influence, and 
the effort and risk of auditing services.  The results indicate that the provision of NASs does 
not affect auditor independence. This evidence is robust in terms of the alternative specification 
of the independence proxy and the observation of a subset of companies considered qualifiable. 
Only when summed to audit fees is there evidence of a negative impact on independence, 
signalling that the client’s economic dependence might be more relevant than NAS with respect 
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to auditor independence. This result is robust to both independence proxies and the subset of 
qualifiable companies. In general, other sources of threats do not seem related to independence. 
This study provides evidence of a market in which auditor independence is expected to be 
compromised, given controlling shareholders’ influence on company management.  
Keywords: Audit fees; Non-audit services; Auditor independence; Corporate governance. 
 
RESUMO 
Este trabalhou avaliou se a prestação dos serviços extra-auditoria afeta a independência dos 
auditores externos em um ambiente caracterizado pela baixa proteção legal aos investidores 
minoritários e com alta concentração de propriedade e controle. Foram analisados os relatórios 
de auditoria e os valores dos serviços extra-auditoria de 154 empresas brasileiras com ações 
negociadas em bolsa, durante 3 anos. A proxy de independência evidencia a modificação da 
opinião do auditor e alternativamente a emissão de ressalva a continuidade da firma. A relação 
entre os serviços extra-auditoria e a independência do auditor é analisada através de modelos 
logit. Os resultados indicam que a prestação de serviços extra-auditoria não afeta a 
independência do auditor. Esta evidência é robusta inclusive em análise da ressalva de 
continuidade da firma e no subconjunto de empresas consideradas ressalváveis. Apenas quando 
adicionados os honorários de auditoria, há a evidência de um impacto negativo sobre a 
independência, sinalizando que a dependência econômica do cliente pode ser mais relevante do 
que os serviços extra-auditoria em respeito à independência do auditor. Este resultado é robusto 
para ambas as proxies de independência e inclusive no subconjunto de empresas ressalváveis. 
Em geral, outras fontes de ameaças não estão relacionadas com a independência. Este estudo 
fornece evidências ao mercado de que a independência do auditor pode ser comprometida, uma 
vez controlada a influência dos acionistas na gestão das companhias. 




Este trabajo tiene como objetivo evaluar si la prestación de servicios de no-auditoría (NAS) 
afecta a la independencia del auditor externo en un país caracterizado por una baja protección 
jurídica de los accionistas minoritarios y una alta concentración de la propiedad y el control. 
Los informes de auditoría y los costos de los servicios se analizan más de 3 años para las 154 
empresas brasileñas. El variable binaria para la independencia indica el informe de un auditor 
calificado y como una especificación alternativa, la emisión de una preocupación de 
continuidad del negocio. La relación de los servicios de no-auditoría y la independencia del 
auditor se analiza mediante modelos logit. Los resultados indican que la prestación de NAS no 
afecta la independencia del auditor. Esta evidencia es sólida en términos de la especificación 
alternativa de la representación de la independencia y la observación de un subconjunto de 
empresas considerados calificables. Sólo cuando se suman los honorarios hay evidencia de un 
impacto negativo sobre la independencia, lo que indica que la dependencia económica del 
cliente podría ser más relevante que NAS, con respecto a la independencia del auditor. Este 
resultado se mantiene tanto las delegaciones de la independencia y el subconjunto de empresas 
calificables. En general, no parecen otras fuentes de amenazas relacionadas con la 
independencia. Este estudio proporciona evidencia de un mercado en el que se espera que la 
independencia del auditor que se vea comprometida, dado que controla la influencia de los 
accionistas en la gestión de la empresa. 
Palabras clave: honorarios de auditoría; servicios de no-auditoría; independencia del 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Auditor independence is a topic debated both by regulators and academics and is an 
important attribute if the external auditor (ANTLE, 1984). Auditor independence ensures 
objectivity, impartiality and a lack of bias when drawing up a report on the client's financial 
statements. Rules stipulated by regulators demand auditor independence to guarantee 
"professional scepticism". Although the literature argues that auditors have incentives to remain 
independent (WATTS; ZIMMERMAN, 1981), past events, such as the Enron case, reinforce 
the need for discussion and research on this subject.  
Discussions regarding factors that can lead to reduced auditor independence focus 
particularly on the provision of advice or consulting services, referred to here as non-audit 
services (NASs). One of the arguments about decreased in auditor independence is based on 
the premise that at some point, the auditor might need to perform an auditing procedure on a 
transaction arising from the provision of NASs. This necessity could result in the auditor's 
objectivity being reduced and the impartiality of his report being compromised.  
Economic dependence on a client and the length of the relationship are also considered 
factors that can reduce auditor independence. By contrast, the auditor has an incentive to 
maintain independence, given that building his market reputation requires him to provide a 
good service over a long period of time. 
Auditor quality is an intrinsically unobservable variable, except for situations involving 
failure. Chadegani and Mohamed (2014) revise the proxies in the literature that measure this 
quality. In this context, measuring auditor independence is an important research challenge. 
Studies that use the auditor's report as a proxy for independence generally consider it a binary 
variable (0/1) that identifies qualified opinions (CRASWELL, 1999) or changes attributable to 
the violation of the going concern assumption (SHARMA; SIDHU, 2001). Other studies, 
however, work with the magnitude of discretionary accruals or the likelihood of meeting 
earnings benchmarks (ASHBAUGH; LAFOND; MAYHEW, 2003). 
The auditor's opinion is related to various factors, including the provision of NASs 
(CALLAGHAN; PARKASH; SINGHAL, 2009; CRASWELL, 1999; DEFOND; 
RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002; HAY; KNECHEL; LI, 2006; WINES, 1994), 
accruals (FRANCIS; KRISHNAN, 1999), the relevance of audit fees (or economic dependence 
on the audit firm’s client) (CHEN; SUN; WU, 2010; LI, 2009; REYNOLDS; FRANCIS, 2000), 
the length of the auditor-client relationship (GEIGER; RAGHUNANDAN, 2002) and earnings 
management (BUTLER; LEONE; WILLENBORG, 2004). 
To date, there is no consensus in the academic literature regarding how the auditor’s 
independence can be compromised by providing NASs. There is evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the provision of these services reduces auditor independence (SHARMA; 
SIDHU, 2001; WINES, 1994); there is also evidence against that hypothesis (CRASWELL, 
1999; DEFOND; RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002). 
Most previous studies that analyse the relationship between the provision of NASs and 
compromised auditor independence have focused on developed capital markets. In Brazil, the 
capital market is characterised by weak legal investor protection, which is typical of countries 
with a civil law regime, combined with a concentrated ownership structure. Consequently, the 
predominant agency problem is conflict between majority and minority shareholders.  
Management’s influence on audit firm selection and the possible impact on the auditor’s 
independence is the subject of research by Dhaliwal et al. (2015). Although those authors find 
evidence of managerial influence on audit firm selection, even after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX), there was no consistent evidence of compromising independence. In a sample of 
400 Brazilian companies, 65% have a controller that has more than 50% of the vote 
(STERNBERG; LEAL; BORTOLON, 2011). Even among companies that lack a controller, 
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shareholder agreements that regulate voting rights, among other provisions, are common. The 
presence of a controller affects the company's management, with the participation of its 
representatives both in the executive office and on the board. In our sample, for example, 
slightly more than 20% of the observed board members are independent. These characteristics 
create the expectation of a closer relationship between the independent auditor and company 
management that might compromise independence. In this scenario, the analysis of the effect 
of non-audit services on auditor independence becomes more relevant. 
Conversely, in Brazil, because of the Brazilian Securities Commission’s (Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários – CVM) 308/1999 rule, which is one of the threats to independence 
identified in the literature, the long-term relationship, is avoided. The rule establishes the 
mandatory rotation of independent audit firms every 5 years, with a minimum term of 3 years 
before rehiring (i.e., a cooling-off period). Mandatory rotation was relaxed between 2009 and 
2011 through CVM Resolution 549/08 to avoid harming the work of companies adhering to 
international accounting standards, which had been mandatory since 2010. The choice of Brazil 
as the study environment allows the investigation of auditor independence without the effect of 
the threat to the long-term relationship. In our sample there were no cases in which this rule had 
been violated. 
This research became feasible only after CVM Instruction 480/09, which mandated the 
disclosure of a report known as the Reference Form (RF), which has a very broad information 
base. The mandatory information to be disclosed includes the amounts paid to audit firms 
related to audit fees and other provided services (COMISSÃO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS 
- CVM, 2009). 
For those interested in this subject, the Brazilian capital market, therefore, provides an 
opportunity to obtain a better understanding of potential threats to auditor independence in a 
very different environment than the more developed capital markets.  
In this context, this study aims to provide empirical evidence of the association between 
the contracting of NASs and auditor independence. 
The proxies adopted to evaluate auditor independence were the qualified audit report 
and the going concern opinion. Other possible sources of threat to auditor independence e.g., 
tenure  Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002), being in the initial years of contracting 
DeAngelo (1981) and being rehired after the cooling-off period are controlled. The possible 
influence of large shareholders or management on auditor independence is also evaluated 
through corporate governance mechanisms known as methods of reducing conflicts of interest 
between controlling and minority shareholders. The percentage of independent members, 
having different persons in the CEO and chairman of the board positions, the presence of an 
audit committee and being listed on the new market, the most demanding corporate governance 
segment of BM&FBOVESPA are control variables in this study’s models.  
This study does not show that auditor independence is compromised by NASs. The 
results are robust both to different proxies for independence and to a sub-sample of qualifiable 
companies (more indebted and with losses). However, when NASs are summed to audit fees, 
our results show a negative impact on independence when the complete sample is observed, but 
not in the sub-sample mentioned. These findings may signal that instead of NASs, economic 
dependence could be a source of concern (CAHAN et al. 2008) 
This study’s main contributions rely on observing an environment that is different from 
previous studies, characterised by weak legal investor protection and control concentration, 
enhancing threats to audit independence through controlling groups’ influence on management. 
The research observes the impact of NASs net of many other sources of threats mentioned in 
the literature, including tenure and low-balling during the first years of a contract. Management 
and large shareholder influence is controlled, observing some good corporate governance 
practices that are recognised as ways to reduce the influence of these groups. Our results also 
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have the potential to be useful both to market regulators and to the auditing community during 
the preparation of guidelines for this profession in the Brazilian capital market.  
 
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
The following sections review the existing literature on the subject and present the 
research hypothesis. 
 
2.1 The Role and Quality of Auditing in Capital Markets 
Capital markets require precision, reliability and objectivity in relation to accounting 
data because such data are used as a basis to evaluate company stock (GRAMLING; 
RITTENBERG; JOHNSTONE, 2012). Accounting allows the reduction of a firm's agency 
costs, and the disclosed financial reports must be monitored. In verifying that the figures 
referring to contractual terms were calculated using accepted procedures, the external audit 
becomes a contract monitoring mechanism (WATTS; ZIMMERMAN, 1986).  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) consider the audit firm's reputation to be a valuable asset. 
Although it is expensive to establish a reputable history, once consolidated, that reputation tends 
to increase the demand for the firm's audit services, and consequently, its fees also increase.  
The loss of audit firm Arthur Andersen's reputation because of its role in the Enron 
scandal has led to articles that analyse the effect of this loss on companies audited by that firm. 
The results of Barton (2005) support the hypothesis that the most visible clients are more 
susceptible to the auditor's reputation and will more quickly replace Arthur Andersen. In 
another study based on the same event (the collapse of Enron), Cahan et al. (2013) find evidence 
that market analysts revised their forecasts downwards to a greater extent, for companies 
audited by Arthur Andersen than for companies audited by the other members of the Big 4 
during the same period. Concern about the auditor's reputation appears to be consistent with the 
loss of Arthur Andersen's clients in the months following the Enron collapse (DEFOND; 
RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002). 
According to agency theory, the external auditor is required both to express an 
independent opinion on a firm’s financial statements and to monitor and supervise management 
actions (FIRTH, 1997). Moreover, managers are incentivised to hire independent external 
auditors to reduce agency costs (JENSEN; MECKLING, 1976). A lack of auditing credibility 
and independence may impose severe restrictions on management, such as increased costs and 
difficulty accessing capital. Auditor independence is crucial, and any deficiency or perceived 
deficiency will increase agency costs (FIRTH, 1997). 
 
2.2 Auditor Competence, Reputation and Independence 
To create a demand for audit services, auditors must convince the market that they are 
competent and independent of the client. Competence implies the probability that the auditor 
will detect a breach of contract, whereas independence indicates the likelihood of the auditor’s 
reporting that breach (WATTS; ZIMMERMAN, 1983, 1986). In other words, the quality of the 
audit service is defined as the combined probability of: (a) the auditor’s discovering a flaw in 
the accounting system of his client and (b) his reporting that flaw (DEANGELO, 1981). 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1981), auditors are incentivised to maintain 
independence, even in the absence of regulation. Thus, independence is considered an important 
attribute of the external auditor (ANTLE, 1984). 
An important aspect related to auditor independence is factual versus apparent 
independence. Factual independence means that the auditor has an independent mentality when 
planning and performing an audit, resulting in an impartial audit report. Apparent independence 
means that the auditor seems to be independent (DOPUCH; KING; SCHWARTZ, 2003). 
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In its conceptual framework on auditor independence, NBC PA 290, issued by the 
Brazilian Federal Accounting Council (Conselho Federal de Contabilidade Brasileiro – CFC), 
discusses independence of thought (factual) and the appearance of independence. Independence 
of thought refers to a posture that allows the auditor to present a conclusion free from the 
influences that compromise his professional judgment, allowing him to act with integrity, 
objectivity and professional scepticism. The appearance of independence, meanwhile, subjects 
the auditor to avoiding significant facts and circumstances to the point that a third party would 
most likely conclude that his integrity, objectivity or professional scepticism has been 
compromised (CONSELHO FEDERAL DE CONTABILIDADE - CFC, 2012). 
Chadegani and Mohamed (2014) revises the literature about how to measure the quality 
of an auditors’ work. Intrinsically unobservable, quality is usually proxied by firm size, 
reputation, tenure and fess, among other things. With respect to independence, some of the 
proxies observed include discretionary accruals and/or earnings management (ASHBAUGH; 
LAFOND; MAYHEW, 2003; CAHAN et al., 2008; JOHNSON; KHURANA; REYNOLDS, 
2002), qualified opinions (CRASWELL, 1999), and the probability of issuing a going concern 
opinion (CAREY; KORTUM; MORONEY, 2012; DHALIWAL et al., 2015; SHARMA; 
SIDHU, 2001). 
 
2.3 Non Audit Fees and Other Threats to Independence 
In addition to NASs, this section presents the literature that investigates other sources 
of threat to independence, including management influence, tenure, switching, and the initial 
period of contracting.  
The incentives that lead an auditor to a loss of independence can be characterised as 
either direct or indirect. Direct incentives involve actual or potential monetary benefits, for 
example, economic dependence on the client, whereas indirect incentives arise from 
circumstances such as the existence of professional or family relationships with members of 
company management or shareholders (JOHNSTONE; WARFIELD; SUTTON, 2001). 
Arguments against the provision of NASs together with financial statement auditing 
services are expressed in terms of economic dependency and the reciprocity of interests 
between the auditor and his client. If NASs become sufficiently important to the auditor, either 
as a whole or in relation to an individual client, this economic dependence can cause bias and 
a loss of impartiality and objectivity (WINES, 1994). It may even provide a reduction of 
independence or a perceived lack of independence, with the auditors possibly becoming 
reluctant to report items that originate from the NASs (FIRTH, 2002). 
If the fees for these services are relatively high, then the economic link can increase the 
likelihood that the auditor will hide "bad news" from shareholders to avoid possible replacement 
by company management (SIMUNIC, 1984). Craswell, Stokes and Laughton (2002) study the 
relationship between the dependence on audit fees and the independence of the external auditor. 
In other words, when formulating their opinions, auditors consider the proportion of fees 
received from a particular client in relation to their total income; this consideration affects their 
professional judgment. For that reason, the following research hypothesis can be proposed: 
H1: Independent auditors are less likely to issue a qualified audit report of 
companies that also receive non-audit services from them. 
Empirical studies, however, are not unanimous with regard to any reduction in auditor 
independence caused by the provision of non-audit services and dependence on fees.  
Wines (1994) investigates the potential reduction in audit independence caused by high 
levels of NASs in the Australian market from 1989-1990. The author found a negative 
relationship between NASs and qualified opinions, concluding that there is a potential problem 
of independence when NASs are provided.  
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Contrary to the findings of Wines (1994), Craswell (1999), also considering the 
Australian market but making use of a sample related to the 1984-1987 period and performing 
a different econometric treatment of the results, was unable to support the hypothesis that NASs 
threaten auditor independence.  
Firth (2002) extends the analysis of the relationship between NASs and the auditor's 
opinion and concludes that the positive relationship between audit fees and NASs is related to 
specific events, such as the issuance of new shares, the implementation of a new information 
or accounting system, reorganisation or restructuring and new CEOs, which require the use of 
consulting services and longer audit hours. The association between NASs and "clean" reports, 
according to that author, is associated with a reduction in auditor independence; conversely, it 
might be that these services help clarify uncertainties and disagreements prior to the audit. 
Hay, Knechel and LI (2006) analyse the 1999-2001 period, finding no significant 
relationship between NASs and the audit report, thus showing no threat to independence. 
Another commonly performed analysis is conducted with regard to auditor's reports that 
poses a threat to the firm's continuity (going concern) and how such a disclosure might be 
affected by the provision of non-audit services. 
Sharma and Sidhu (2001) analyse a sample of 49 bankrupt companies in the Australian 
market from 1989-1996. Their findings indicate that the provision of NASs reduces the 
likelihood of the auditor’s changing his opinion to report going concern problems. 
Focusing on the US market, Defond, Raghunandan and Subramanyam (2002) find no 
association between the provision of NASs and reduced auditor independence. The authors used 
a sample of 1,158 firms, of which 96 had a qualified report regarding going concern issues. 
After several robustness tests, the authors suggested that the institutional incentives of the 
market itself, such as loss of reputation and litigation costs, outweigh the economic dependency 
created by higher fees. 
The work of Basioudis, Papakonstantinou and Geiger (2008) uses a sample of 58 
financially "stressed" companies, of which 29 received a report with a changed opinion 
regarding the firm’s continuity and the rest (control sample) did not. The results, referring to 
the UK during the 2003 period, suggest that companies that pay more for NASs are less likely 
to receive a report with a changed opinion regarding going-concern issues. Based on the results 
of their research, the authors claim that although there is a threat to auditor independence, this 
threat is not conclusive with regard to a loss of auditor independence because, as Firth (2002) 
confirms, NASs can be beneficial to the audit process. 
The hiring of the audit firm and the negotiation of fees is performed by the company's 
management. Management's influence in the decision-making process when hiring an auditor 
may lead to shareholder concerns about the maintenance of auditor independence in 
safeguarding investors' interests (DHALIWAL et al., 2015). In a country such as Brazil, in 
which Sternberg, Leal and Bortolon (2011)have found that 65% of companies have a controller 
with more than 50% of the votes, the influence on audit-firm work is expected to be a concern. 
Controllers’ representatives typically influence both executives and the board. In our sample, 
for example, slightly more than 20% of the observed board members are independent.  
Tenure is another threat to independence that is investigated in the literature. As the 
result of a long-time relationship with a client, an audit firm will be more confident and less 
demanding and innovative in audit procedures. In their research on this topic, Johnson, Khurana 
and Reynolds (2002) arrive at curious results, showing lower financial-report quality for short 
audit tenures but not for long-standing relationships. However, the authors note that this 
conclusion should not be extended to environments that involve the mandatory rotation of an 
audit firm. 
114 




Revista Universo Contábil, ISSN 1809-3337, FURB, Blumenau, v. 12, n. 4, p. 107-128, out./dez., 2016 
Switching audit firms raises concerns about two sources of threats to audit 
independence. First, the possible loss of a contract can influence auditors to be more complacent 
in their reports to a switching client. However, the opposite may also occur, with a qualified 
report triggering an audit switch. Krishnan; Krishnan and Stephens (1996) find evidence of a 
two-way causation effect. The second threat that involves switching auditors arises out of the 
intertemporal fee structure of audit services and how that structure can influence independence. 
Simon and Francis (1988) find evidence of significant fee reductions in the first year of a 
contract, with price recovery only after four years. DeAngelo (1981) calls this initial period 
during which audit firms engage in aggressive price competition as “low balling”. Contrary to 
expectations, (DeAngelo (1981) shows that “low balling” does not impact independence.  
In Brazil, mandatory rotation requires the audit firm to be changed every 5 years, and 
rehiring is only allowed after 3 years. However, Martinez and Reis (2010) analysis finds no 
evidence of the effect of mandatory rotation on earnings management in Brazilian companies.  
The Brazilian environment is also characterised by a possible concentration of auditing. 
Dantas et al. (2012) work, analysing the 2000-2009 period, suggests that depending on the 
indicator used to measure market concentration, there is a moderate to high concentration (when 
using the HHI – Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), but this effect is inconclusive when the C4 is 
used (the participation rate of the 4 largest audit firms in the examined period). 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
Methodological procedures, the database, the development of the independence proxy 
and the adopted econometric model are presented in the following sections. 
 
3.1 Data Collection and Processing 
The study population is composed of Brazilian companies listed on BM&FBovespa 
from 2010-2012. The data needed for this study were primarily drawn from 3 information 
sources. Accounting and financial data were obtained using (i) Economatica® software (from 
Economatica Support to Investors Software LLC, São Paulo, SP, Brazil). This step was 
followed by the collection of data on corporate governance and NASs and fees, obtained from 
the (ii) Reference Form (RF). The audit reports were classified into qualified and clean reports 
to create the proxy for auditor independence (iii). A second proxy identified whether the audit 
report provided evidence of violation of the company’s going concern assumption. 
Reference forms (RF) published in 2011-2013 and that contained information related to 
fiscal years 2010-2012, were studied. The rationale for choosing this period was that during the 
analysis of the first RFs published in 2010, low-quality information was identified, in addition 
to the existence of several incomplete reports. 
It was decided to use only companies audited by one of the Big 4. This decision meant 
that a more homogeneous study sample could be created in terms of the quality of services 
provided and the size of the independent audit firm. The final sample included 154 companies 
observed over the 3 years and audited by one of the Big 4: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG or Ernst & Young. 
 
3.2 Independence Proxy and Audit Reports 
Measuring auditor independence is not an easy task, given that researchers estimate 
different metrics or use different proxies to attempt to capture the effect of the external auditor's 
independence. These metrics may include the issuing of a qualified or adverse opinion or 
disclaimer opinion and the level of discretionary accruals. 
In this research, auditor independence is identified using the auditor's report. A qualified 
auditor's opinion may indicate independence meaning that the auditor concludes either that the 
financial statements are materially misstated or that he is unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate 
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evidence to conclude that the financial statements are not free from material misstatement 
(CONSELHO FEDERAL DE CONTABILIDADE - CFC, 2011). 
In Brazil, the audit report has some peculiarities. The decision to issue a qualified 
opinion and report it to the market certainly demonstrates auditor independence in relation to 
an auditor’s client. However, as a result of previous research, for example, that of Damascena, 
Paulo and Cavalcante (2011), it was necessary to expand the analysis of the qualified auditor's 
opinion to include paragraphs of emphasis. 
Therefore, the report is considered "qualified" in the following circumstances: when it 
is unqualified with emphasis or contains a qualified, adverse or disclaimer opinion, as shown 
below in Table 1: 
 
Table 1 - Change in the Auditor's Opinion 
Types of Report Report Basis 
Unqualified opinion Clean 
NBC TA 700 - An unchanged opinion is one expressed by the 
auditor when he concludes that the financial statements are prepared, 
in all material respects, in accordance with the financial reporting 
framework (CONSELHO FEDERAL DE CONTABILIDADE - 
CFC, 2011) . 
Unqualified opinion with 
paragraph(s) of emphasis 
Qualified 
Several events are presented either as exceptions or as paragraphs of 
emphasis, such as: a change in accounting practice, paralysed 
operating activities, tax credits, various debts, lawsuits, etc. 
(DAMASCENA; PAULO; CAVALCANTE, 2011). 
Qualified opinion 
Qualified 
NBC TA 705 - The auditor must modify the opinion in his report 
when he concludes, based on the audit evidence obtained, either that 
the financial statements as a whole are materially misstated or that 
the auditor is unable to obtain appropriate and sufficient evidence to 
conclude that the financial statements as a whole are not free from 
material misstatement (CONSELHO FEDERAL DE 
CONTABILIDADE - CFC, 2011). 
Adverse opinion 
Disclaimer of opinion 
 
It is noteworthy that in the case of paragraphs of emphasis, divergence from accounting 
practice due to the valuation of investments in subsidiaries and affiliates was disregarded. This 
procedure was necessary due to the large number of “qualified reports”  that would be involved 
but that would not necessarily represent relevant data, such as the changes that occurred because 
of the methodology that Brazil adopted when it adopted international accounting standards. 
Table 2 below illustrates the emphases that were considered (or not considered) to represent a 
qualified auditor's opinion. 
 
Table 2 - Examples of Emphases in the Audit Reports 
Emphases Considered to be a Change in the 
Auditor's Opinion 
Emphases Not Considered to be a Change in the 
Auditor's Opinion 
 A substantial part of, or all transactions, is/are 
conducted with a related party, which can generate 
a high degree of dependence; 
 Uncertainty of receipt of the client's accounts 
receivable; 
 Absence in the financial statements of provisions 
for loss of assets or adjustments due to 
uncertainties. 
 Divergence in the accounting policy due to the 
valuation of investments in subsidiaries, affiliates 
and controlled companies. Together, they should 
be valued using the equity method, whereas for 
IFRS purposes, the cost or fair value should be 
used; 
 Restatement of previously issued opinion 
attributable to the restatement of financial 
statements, provided the auditor agrees with the 
reclassifications made in the restatement; 
 Absence of audit in the Social Report. 
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Given the difficulty of identifying the auditors’ independence that this research used as 
a second measure, as in Carey, Kortum and Moroney (2012), the issuance of a going concern 
modified audit opinions. 
 
3.3 Econometric Model 
The effect of contracting NASs on the likelihood of the auditor issuing a qualified report 
is analysed using the following logit regression model: 
 
(OPINION;GOING CONCERN) = αi + β1NASit + β2NAS/AUDFEEit + β3AUDFEE + 
NASit + β4INITIALit + β5TENUREit + β6REHIREDit + β7RIGHTSMISit + β8NM2it + 
β9EXTit + β10CEOit + β11AUDCMTit  +β12SIZE it + β13DEBT it + β14INVENTORYit + 




OPINION  = dummy, takes the value of 1 if the audit report contains some 
change, otherwise 0 
GOING CONCERN = dummy, takes the value of 1 if the audit report contains some 
change related to a violation of the going concern assumption 
(Going Concern Opinion), otherwise 0 
NAS = natural logarithm of the value of non-audit service fees 
NAS/AUDFEE = ratio of the amount paid for non-audit services to the amounts 
paid for an audit of the financial statements 
AUDFEE+NAS = natural logarithm of the sum of the audit and non-audit service 
fees 
INITIAL = dummy, takes the value of 1 if the audit engagement is in either 
the first or second year 
TENURE = measured as the number of continuous years of auditor 
employment since 2004  
REHIRED dummy, takes the value of 1 if the audit firm was rehired after the 
three year minimum cooling-off period 
RIGHTSMIS = rights mismatch, calculated using the ratio of the percentage of 
shares with voting rights and the total percentage of shares, both of 
the largest shareholder  
NM2 =dummy, takes the value of 1 if the company is listed on the Novo 
Mercado or Level 2 of BM&FBovespa (segments with more 
demanding rules for corporate governance)  
EXT = independent board members, calculated based on the percentage 
of independent board members  
CEO =dummy, takes the value of 1 if the president of the board of 
directors and the CEO are different people  
AUDCMT = dummy, takes the value of 1 if the firm has an audit committee  
SIZE = calculated according to the natural logarithm of total assets  
DEBT = evaluated as the ratio of the short-term and long-term debt to total 
assets  
INVENTORY = ratio of inventory to total assets  
RECEIVABLES = ratio of receivables to total assets 
RETURN = firms' return on 31/03/XX, calculated using the following 
formula: RET = Ln (Pt+1/ Pt) 
LOSS = dummy, equal to 1 if loss is reported in the year  
AGE = logarithm of the number of years listed on the stock exchange 
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DELAY = number of days between the end of the financial year and the 
issuance of the audit report  
 
The largest companies (SIZE) tend to have a lower likelihood of default because they 
have more resources to renegotiate financial commitments. Therefore, it is less likely that their 
audit report will be qualified (DEFOND; RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002; 
REYNOLDS; FRANCIS, 2000). Companies with high levels of debt (DEBT) may experience 
difficulty meeting their commitments and obtaining new financing, which would increase the 
risk of financial stress and the likelihood of qualifications to the audit report (DEFOND; 
RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002). Debt further increases both agency costs and 
company risk, requiring more effort from the auditor because of a higher audit risk (FIRTH, 
2002). 
It is noteworthy that both INVENTORY and RECEIVABLES are assets that are more 
difficult to audit and require more effort, consequently creating an increased audit risk. 
Therefore, these assets are more strongly associated with audit errors, leading to increased 
litigation (FIRTH, 2002; HAY; KNECHEL; LI, 2006).  
Companies with lower RETURNS are more likely experience financial difficulties and 
therefore are more likely to receive qualifications from their auditors (DEFOND; 
RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002). In short, the DEBT, INVENTORY, 
RECEIVABLES, RETURN and LOSS variables are proxies for various risk factors, and 
therefore, a significant relationship is expected with the propensity for audit reports to be 
changed. 
Companies that have been on the market longer (AGE) would have reduced likelihood 
of going into default, given that they are better known by, and less involved in litigation with, 
investors, which negatively affects the probability of a qualified auditor’s report (DEFOND; 
RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002; FIRTH, 2002). 
The auditor needs time (DELAY) to address problems that require a more thorough 
examination. Those problems generally include discussions with managers and can involve 
many aspects, including breach of covenants, earnings management, fraud, etc. However, 
auditors are pressured by managers to reduce audit time, which can often lead to the auditor 
agreeing with management (SHARMA; SIDHU, 2001). Moreover, Mutchler, Hopwood and 
Mckeown (1997) show that large audit firms are more likely to issue qualified opinions. 
Given the importance of management in the client-auditor relationship Dhaliwal et al. 
(2015) and the relevance of this subject in a scenario such as that of Brazil, which is 
characterised by ownership and control concentration, it is important to control for some 
corporate governance characteristics that can minimise these effects. For that reason, 
RIGHTSMIS (rights mismatch), NM2 (different levels of corporate governance), EXT 
(independent members of the board), CEO (chairman of the board of directors and CEO being 
different people) and AUDCMT (audit committee) were included. Except for RIGHTSMIS, the 
other variables are proxies for good corporate governance practices and might signal less 
influence of management and controlling shareholders over the independent auditor. 
Additionally, based on the premise established by Griffin, Lont and Sun (2008), good 
governance practices reduce audit risk. Therefore, for those representing good practices (NM2, 
EXT, CEO and AUDCMT), a positive relationship is expected with auditor independence, 
whereas a negative relationship is expected between auditor independence and RIGHTSMIS. 
The existence of a long-standing relationship is another potential threat to auditor 
independence that has been studied in the literature (JOHNSON; KHURANA; REYNOLDS, 
2002). To control for this potential influence, we add the variable TENURE, which measures 
the number of years of auditor employment. Therefore, the expected sign is negative. 
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In a country such as Brazil, where regulations require mandatory rotation of audit firms 
every five years, long-term relationships are not expected. However, rehiring is allowed after a 
three-year cooling-off period. Rehiring may represent a strong connection between the audit 
firm and the company, and this relationship might represent a threat to independence. Therefore, 
the model controls for this possibility through REHIRED and the expected sign is negative. 
The extant literature shows that audit fees have an intertemporal structure, with the 
initial years of hiring representing a “low balling” period (DEANGELO, 1981; SIMON; 
FRANCIS, 1988). The price decrease in the initial years (which is intended to attract the client) 
can also represent a threat to independence. Contrary to expectations, De Angelo (1981) shows 
that “low balling” does not have an impact on independence. REHIRED identifies this type of 
event in the sample. 
 
4 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The results of the descriptive analysis, the econometric models and the adopted 
robustness tests are presented below. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The figures for the descriptive statistics regarding variables of a continuous nature, such 
as means and standard deviations, and mean qualitative data (binary) are shown in Table 3. 
On average, companies in the sample have a DEBT of 57.6%, ranging between 6.2% 
and 144%, in relation to total assets. The mean time between financial year end 31/12 and the 
date of issue of the audit report is 68 days. 
 







AGE 437              0.958                     0.364  0.000 1.415 
AUDFEE/ASSET 437              0.316                     0.357  0.001 2.375 
AUDFEE+NAS 437            13.459                     1.203  9.602 16.994 
DEBT 437              0.576                     0.214  0.062 1.444 
DELAY 437            68.009                   19.497  23.000 151.000 
EXT 437              0.228                     0.209  0.000 0.889 
INVENTORY 437              0.089                     0.093  0.000 0.344 
NAS 437              5.761                     6.171  0.000 15.133 
NAS/AUDFEE 437              0.290                     1.609  0.000 32.095 
RECEIVABLES 437              0.151                     0.113  0.000 0.475 
RETURN 437              0.023                     0.382  -1.361 0.820 
RIGHTSMIS 437              1.180                     0.371  0.743 3.000 
SIZE 437            15.008                     1.498  10.823 19.304 
TENURE 437          3.382                   2.194 1 8 
Qualitative Variables Mean (%) Qualitative Variables Mean (%) 
AUDCMT               35.24  LOSS               18.31  
CEO               84.67  NM2               58.12  
GOING CONCERN               10.07  OPINION               16.48  
INITIAL               38.67 REHIRED                  3.43 
Obs.: All continuous variables were Winsorised at 1% and 99%. 
The mean RETURN of the companies was 2.3%, and 18% of the sampled companies 
showed a LOSS.  
In analysing the AGE variable, the final sample of this study includes companies 
considered "newcomers" on the BM&FBovespa and companies that have been listed for a long 
period of time, i.e., companies that are well known by investors in the Brazilian capital market.  
With regard to corporate governance aspects, it is noteworthy that 58% of the companies 
are listed on the Novo Mercado or Level 2 (NM2) and 35% of companies have an audit 
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committee (AUDCMT). In addition, it can be observed that in approximately 85% of these 
companies, the chairman and CEO are different people and only 22.8% of board members are 
independent. Finally, 16% of the companies received a qualified audit report (OPINION) in 1 
or more of the surveyed years, and 10% of the companies received an audit report that was 
qualified because of a violation of the going concern assumption (GOING CONCERN). 
The average employment time in the sample is 3.4 years (TENURE), and 38% of audit 
firms are in the first or second year of their contract (INITIAL). These data indicates that long-
term relationships may not be a concern. In the sample, 34% of audit firms were rehired after 
the cooling-off period (REHIRED). 
Table 4 shows the number of companies present in the sample by sector and the mean 
values of the audit fees and NAS fees in US$ for 2010-2012. 
 
Table 4 - Mean Values of Spending on Audit Fees and Non-audit Services, by Sector 
Sector Companies 
Audit Fees (US$) Non-audit Services (US$) 
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Agro and Fishery 1  322,792   109,725   123,905   196,198   417,290   55,989  
Food and Drink 7  952,659   1,810,616   1,346,593   459,623   572,198   367,173  
Trade  11  535,128   724,171   561,995   245,454   201,331   299,882  
Construction  15  459,106   463,921   475,557   86,255   58,354   48,815  
Electronics  5  546,762   404,481   384,494   104,417   24,066   21,673  
Electricity 18  442,103   446,208   280,258   129,967   143,850   322,380  
Industrial Machinery 4  309,633   370,715   337,390   228,525   105,354   51,323  
Mining  4  3,523,543   3,412,008   2,900,980   215,889   223,137   291,139  
Non-metallic Minerals 1  385,839   534,257   99,929   -     -     -    
Others  30  369,272   462,838   348,204   363,353   351,981   232,356  
Pulp and Paper 3  1,119,807   901,112   992,643   801,290   113,749   125,109  
Oil and Gas 2  221,966   237,767   208,195   9,667   63,082   174,005  
Chemicals  8  689,385   869,688   803,323   900,764   57,751   321,328  
Steel and Metallurgy 13  1,236,539   1,462,863   1,358,344   264,953   144,790   230,240  
Software and Data 2  480,123   481,909   392,705   206,854   257,822   148,140  
Telecommunications 4  1,826,597   2,554,462   997,881   46,343   235,590   346,911  
Textiles   8  190,553   217,218   135,999   100,180   160,707   104,636  
Transport Services 10  678,093   824,941   780,966   85,553   204,771   190,477  
Vehicles and Parts 8  601,818   820,029   738,049   92,962   573,411   123,383  
Overall mean 154  675,537   806,466   651,885   238,179   239,544   213,392  
Obs.: Data regarding information on the amount paid to the auditing firm for the provision of auditing of the 
financial statements and non-audit services were extracted from Reference Forms of 154 Brazilian companies 
listed on BM&FBovespa in the years 2010 to 2012. Values in R$ (Reais) were converted to US$ (dollars) using 
the average annual exchange rate. The classification of sectors was performed using Economatica® software. 
With regard to NASs, especially with regard to 2010, the "Pulp and Paper" sector, which 
contained only 3 companies, paid an average of US$ 0.35 million. The "Chemicals" sector spent 
an average of US$ 0.43 million on NASs, with 8 companies in the sample belonging to this 
sector. On average, during this period, the cost of NASs represented 32% of the amount paid 
for the audit service. 
 
4.2 Propensity to Change the Audit Report 
Table 5 shows the results for the models with the dependent variable being the presence 
of a qualified opinion (models 1 to 3) and the auditor's opinion on the firm’s continuity (models 
4 to 6). This type of approach has been adopted in studies conducted in countries with capital 
markets considered to be more developed (BASIOUDIS; PAPAKONSTANTINOU; GEIGER, 
2008; DEFOND; RAGHUNANDAN; SUBRAMANYAM, 2002; SHARMA; SIDHU, 2001). 
To date, it is known that there is insufficient evidence from empirical studies conducted in 
Brazil.  
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Table 5 - Propensity to Change an Audit Report  
(OPINION;GOING CONCERN) = αi + β1NASit + β2NAS/AUDFEEit + β3AUDFEE+NASit + β4SIZE it + β5DEBT it + β6INVENTORYit + β7RECEIVABLESit + β8RETURNit + 





Dependent Variable: OPINION Dependent Variable: GOING CONCERN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
NAS - -0.0323 (-1.212)     -0.0304 (-0.904)     
NAS/AUDFEE -   -0.199 (-0.716)     -0.108 (-0.884)   
AUDFEE+NAS -     -0.403* (-2.036)     -0.523** (-2.586) 
INITIAL  -0.439 (-0.979) -0.370 (-0.817) -0.543 (-1.215) -0.980 (-1.517) -0.908 (-1.373) -1.111 (-1.851) 
TENURE  -0.106 (-1.071) -0.0986 (-0.974) -0.115 (-1.142) -0.232 (-1.426) -0.227 (-1.357) -0.247 (-1.617) 
REHIRED  0.748 (1.004) 0.754 (1.015) 0.806 (1.042) 0.466 (0.399) 0.470 (0.409) 0.516 (0.407) 
RIGHTMIS - -0.464 (-1.002) -0.437 (-0.934) -0.542 (-1.211) 0.213 (0.373) 0.254 (0.448) 0.147 (0.273) 
NM + 0.00426 (0.0089) 0.00347 (0.0073) 0.134 (0.273) -0.518 (-0.943) -0.551 (-1.014) -0.283 (-0.509) 
EXT + 2.189* (2.178) 2.212* (2.223) 2.226* (2.162) 0.431 (0.385) 0.521 (0.464) 0.328 (0.296) 
CEO + -1.208** (-2.793) -1.212** (-2.775) -1.219** (-2.823) -0.712 (-1.149) -0.730 (-1.159) -0.697 (-1.182) 
AUDCMT + 0.120 (0.366) 0.0384 (0.114) 0.199 (0.548) -0.0953 (-0.209) -0.203 (-0.450) 0.0742 (0.151) 
SIZE - -0.0882 (-0.710) -0.120 (-0.960) 0.0274 (0.203) 0.122 (0.855) 0.102 (0.710) 0.271 (1.806) 
DEBT + 2.288** (2.699) 2.308** (2.675) 2.437** (2.792) 3.034* (2.331) 3.068* (2.278) 3.327* (2.409) 
INVENTORY + -6.624* (-2.192) -7.035* (-2.323) -5.326 (-1.747) -11.56** (-2.882) -12.12** (-3.036) -8.483* (-2.195) 
RECEIVABLES + -4.897* (-2.426) -4.627* (-2.338) -5.397** (-2.603) -2.242 (-0.987) -1.870 (-0.853) -3.206 (-1.359) 
RETURN - -0.570 (-1.239) -0.541 (-1.160) -0.485 (-1.064) -0.868 (-1.541) -0.790 (-1.413) -0.687 (-1.287) 
LOSS + 1.036* (2.550) 1.040* (2.538) 1.151** (2.778) 1.226* (2.482) 1.241* (2.459) 1.397** (2.839) 
AGE - 0.550 (0.987) 0.569 (0.991) 0.543 (0.981) -1.336 (-1.761) -1.339 (-1.713) -1.437 (-1.851) 
DELAY + 0.0266** (3.618) 0.0281** (3.935) 0.0260** (3.631) 0.0401** (4.099) 0.0412** (4.215) 0.0381** (3.657) 
CONSTANT +/- -1.649 (-0.760) -1.500 (-0.679) 1.770 (0.590) -5.391* (-2.331) -5.364* (-2.297) -0.922 (-0.305) 
Observations  437 437 437 437 437 437 
Pseudo R-sq  0.259 0.258 0.270 0.363 0.362 0.383 
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The coefficients of the variables of interest, (NAS) and (NAS/AUDFEE), had a negative 
sign; however, this result was not statistically significant. This evidence indicates that the 
provision of non-audit services did not necessarily result in a greater likelihood of a qualified 
audit report or a report with going concern statement being issued. In other words, there is no 
evidence of reduced auditor independence caused by the provision of NASs in the sample. Our 
results are in line with Craswell (1999); Defond, Raghunandan and Subramanyam (2002) and 
Hay, Knechel and Li (2006). 
The provision of NASs in conjunction with an audit may lead to reduced auditor 
independence attributable to the possible dependence of the auditor's firm on his client or the 
possibility of the auditor’s avoiding changing the report based on a procedure arising out of his 
consultancy. However, Firth (2002) argues that NASs can actually help the client solve 
problems. Such problems may be related to the accounting system, inefficient information and 
management, fraud detection, high debt levels and low liquidity levels. Moreover, as Defond, 
Raghunandan and Subramanyam (2002) note, institutional incentives related to the costs of a 
possible loss of reputation are sufficient to maintain auditors' independence even when 
providing services other than auditing.  
However, when the fees for NASs are summed with audit fees, both approaches, with 
OPINION and GOING CONCERN as dependent variables (models 3 and 6), show a negative 
and statistically significant impact on independence. This result may signal that it is not the 
type of service (audit or non-audit), but the total fees and the possible resulting economic 
dependence on the client that compromises independence.Cahan et al. (2008) investigate the 
impact of NASs on independence using discretionary accruals as a proxy. Their results also do 
not show a significant relationship between NASs and compromising independence. However, 
they also find significant results for a specific subset in which NASs interacts with client 
importance. The positive relation between NASs and discretionary accruals arises when the 
economic bond comes from NASs and the client is more important (in terms of the revenues 
from that client). 
The models tested have controls for other threats to independence. Despite their negative 
sign, a long-term relationship (TENURE) and being in the first two years of contract (INITIAL) 
do not show statistical significance and do not impact independence. Being rehired after the 
cooling-off period (REHIRED), which could represent a strong connection to a client, does not 
impact independence. 
Management’s influence in hiring and monitoring auditor work raises concerns about 
compromised audit independence (DHALIWAL et al., 2015). In a country such as Brazil, which 
is characterised by ownership and control concentration and boards with few independent 
members, this is a special concern that could be minimised by good corporate governance 
practices.  
The presence of independent board members (EXT) increases the auditor’s propensity 
to issue a qualified report. This result may be related to increased monitoring by independent 
board members. In contrast, when the chairman of the board of directors and the CEO are 
different individuals (CEO), as recommended in terms of best corporate governance practice, 
the likelihood of issuing a qualified report is reduced. This result, which in principle is contrary 
to expectations, may be attributable to Brazil’s specific characteristics. Brazil’s high ownership 
concentration can be reflected in the occupation of these positions by representatives of 
controllers or families that can affect the relationship between the company and its auditors. 
Further data and analysis are required to research this possibility. 
That said, the results for EXT and CEO are not maintained in the models with GOING 
CONCERN as the dependent variable. 
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Table 6 - Propensity to Change an Audit Report (Sample of Qualifiable Companies) 
(OPINION;GOING CONCERN) = αi + β1NASit + β2NAS/AUDFEEit + β3AUDFEE+NASit + β4SIZE it + β5DEBT it + β6INVENTORYit + β7RECEIVABLESit + β8RETURNit + 
β9LOSSit + β10AGE it + β11DELAYit +  β12RIGHTSMISit + β13NM2it + β14EXTit + β15CEOit + β16AUDCMTit + β17INITIALit + β18TERNUREit + β19REHIREDit+ εit 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: OPINION Dependent Variable: GOING CONCERN 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
NAS -0.0375 (-0.374)     -0.0691 (-0.739)     
NAS_AUDFEE   2.409 (0.847)     3.400 (1.234)   
AUDFEE+NAS     -1.385 (-1.674)     -4.206* (-2.253) 
INITIAL 1.345 (0.824) 1.615 (1.157) 0.781 (0.322) 3.959 (1.408) 4.605 (1.767) 3.870 (1.175) 
TENURE 0.444 (1.384) 0.710 (1.390) 0.489 (0.995) 1.889 (1.853) 2.179* (2.415) 2.839** (2.755) 
REHIRED(1) 2.006 (1.199) 2.215 (1.384) 1.967 (1.166) -  -  -  
RIGHTMIS 0.409 (0.228) -0.112 (-0.0576) 0.580 (0.345) 1.444 (0.672) 0.364 (0.119) -0.121 (-0.0317) 
NM -0.739 (-0.478) -0.572 (-0.300) -0.587 (-0.395) -1.636 (-0.886) -1.365 (-0.562) 0.498 (0.243) 
EXT 4.011 (0.783) 4.267 (0.973) 3.583 (0.665) -1.918 (-0.451) 1.272 (0.423) -3.743 (-0.930) 
CEO -0.408 (-0.315) -0.619 (-0.389) -0.803 (-0.586) 0.550 (0.400) 0.145 (0.102) 1.068 (0.590) 
AUDCMT -0.814 (-0.574) -1.009 (-0.565) -1.107 (-0.554) -2.253 (-1.355) -2.639 (-1.639) -4.410 (-1.906) 
SIZE -0.227 (-0.324) -0.234 (-0.311) 0.937 (0.674) 1.089 (1.287) 0.863 (1.417) 5.121* (2.394) 
DEBT 4.201 (0.693) 2.953 (0.579) 6.517 (1.131) 6.404* (2.364) 6.105 (1.609) 20.65* (2.018) 
INVENTORY -1.355 (-0.144) -4.415 (-0.457) -2.746 (-0.290) -1.773 (-0.155) -7.560 (-0.675) -13.46 (-1.039) 
RECEIVABLES -5.839 (-0.502) -3.566 (-0.334) -4.451 (-0.371) -6.493 (-0.652) -1.466 (-0.189) -2.345 (-0.217) 
RETURN -0.248 (-0.257) -0.286 (-0.288) -0.351 (-0.356) -4.189 (-1.477) -3.025 (-1.674) -5.846** (-2.719) 
AGE -1.343 (-0.716) -0.0941 (-0.0359) -1.039 (-0.517) -7.601 (-1.323) -4.700 (-0.863) -5.877 (-1.296) 
DELAY 0.0249 (1.188) 0.0132 (0.747) 0.0140 (0.799) 0.0358 (1.693) 0.0206 (1.001) 0.0314 (0.821) 
CONSTANT -3.082 (-0.353) -2.648 (-0.269) -2.376 (-0.235) -26.34* (-2.541) -24.55** (-2.625) -42.71* (-2.417) 
Observations 46  46  46  44  44  44  
Pseudo R-sq 0.255   0.275   0.287   0.493   0.514   0.593   
Obs.: (1) REHIRED was dropped in models 4 to 6 because of collinearity with GOING CONCERN. **,* were significant at 1% and 5% respectively. All continuous variables 
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The time between the end of the financial year and the issuing of the audit report 
(DELAY) also helped increase the probability of either a qualified report or a report with a 
going concern opinion. As Sharma and Sidhu (2001) find, longer periods may be related to 
greater efforts being made by the auditor to alert management to problems related to breach of 
covenants, accounting practices not in accordance with prevailing accounting standards and 
even fraud. Contrary to expectations, the SIZE variable had a positive sign; however, it had no 
statistical significance. 
The results also indicate that companies with higher levels of RECEIVABLES and 
INVENTORY have a lower propensity to receive a qualified opinion, although receivables are 
assets that require a greater auditing effort because of the difficulties involved in auditing them 
(FIRTH, 2002).  
The robustness test involved the definition of a specific segment of the sample. The 
sample was divided into companies considered qualifiable, i.e., more indebted companies 
(DEBT) and those with the disclosure of loss (LOSS). It was assumed that these characteristics 
increase the likelihood that the auditor will issue a qualified audit report. Given this premise, a 
new analysis was performed using only those companies considered qualifiable, i.e., those with 
a high level of debt or disclosing loss. The purpose of this sample section is to determine, for 
the companies considered qualifiable, whether contracting NASs reduces auditor independence. 
The observations were first classified in order of increasing debt and divided into 
quartiles, with the sample taken comprising the 25% of companies that were the most indebted. 
Finally, companies that presented a loss (LOSS) were retained in the subsample and the rest 
excluded.  
The subsample of qualifiable companies had 46 observations, of which 18 (39.13%) 
companies received a qualified audit report and 14 companies (30.43%) received a report with 
statements about the firm's continuity. The logit regression results are shown in Table 6. 
The results are similar to the broad sample. The only version of NASs that showed 
statistical significance was the one in which the values of fees are summed to audit services. 
The evidence in favour of economic dependence (more than NAS specifically) compromising 
independence is repeated. Unlike previous results and the expected sign, TENURE showed a 
positive and significant relationship with the probability of receiving a going concern opinion. 
The small sample in this analysis raises concerns about the validity of the conclusions. 
These results suggest, moreover, that threats to independence should be investigated in specific 
situations more than in general situations. 
 
5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This study aimed at evaluating whether the provision of NASs together with the audit 
of financial statements reduces the independence of the external auditors of Brazilian 
companies traded on BM&FBovespa. 
For public companies, although there is a legal obligation, it is necessary to ensure 
auditors' independence from their clients because, if this independence is violated, in addition 
to the loss of the audit firm's reputation, the companies involved may incur increased agency 
costs. Auditor independence is understood to mean the probability of issuing an audit report 
that informs the market of the existence of accounting information that is either low quality or 
in violation of accounting practices. However, it is first necessary for the auditor to be 
competent to identify this failure. 
One of the great debates, both in academia and among regulators concerns whether 
auditor independence is reduced when auditors are hired by their clients to provide NASs. This 
reduction in independence may occur because of the economic importance that these services 
can assume, whether as a whole or with regard to a particular client. Another argument is that 
auditors might be reluctant to change their opinion about a procedure resulting from their 
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consultancy. In contrast, the provision of NASs together with the audit of financial statements 
could favour the audit process. These additional services contracted by clients will result in the 
auditor’s having a more in-depth knowledge of the business.  
The quality of auditors’ work and their independence are important challenges to 
research in this topic (CHADEGANI; MOHAMED, 2014). Based on previous work set in 
countries with different characteristics, such as  Wines (1994), Craswell (1999) and Firth 
(2002), among others, the opinion contained in the audit report was used in this research as a 
proxy for independence. Two proxies were used: the existence of a qualified opinion and a 
going-concern statement.  
Brazil offers an environment unlike that of studies centred in developed economies. 
Because Brazil is considered a country offering weak legal protections to minority shareholders 
with ownership and control concentration, large shareholders’ influence on management and 
relationship with auditors might compromise the independence of audit firms. Conversely, the 
regulatory obligation of switching auditors every five years reduces the threat to independence 
posed by the existence of a long-term relationship.  
The results indicate that there is no reduction in auditor independence attributable to the 
provision of NASs. The findings are robust across the two different specifications of the 
independence proxy (qualified opinion and going concern), NASs (value of NASs and the ratio 
of non-audit/audit services values) and for a subsample of qualifiable companies (more indebted 
and with losses).  
However, when the fees for NASs are summed with audit fees, our results show a 
negative and significant impact on independence for both proxies (qualified opinion and going 
concern) and in the subsample of qualifiable companies (with the going concern proxy for 
independence). This result may signal that it is not the type of service (audit or non-audit), but 
the total fees and the possible resulting economic dependence on the client that compromises 
independence. Cahan et al. (2008) result also finds a significant relationship between NAS and 
independence only in a specific subset in which NASs interacts with client importance.  
The models contain controls for many other threats to independence mentioned in the 
literature. A long-term relationship (TENURE), being in the first two years of a contract 
(INITIAL) and being rehired after the cooling-off period (REHIRED) do not have a statistically 
significant relationship with proxies for independence. 
In an environment such as Brazil, in which ownership and control concentration and 
their influence on management could represent threats to audit-firm independence, it is 
important to control for corporate governance characteristics that can minimise these effects. 
The research examined controls for rights mismatch (RIGHTMIS), being listed in a new 
market, the most demanding segment of BM&FBOVESPA in terms of corporate governance 
(NM), having different persons as CEO and chairman of the board (CEO), having an audit 
committee (AUDCMT) and the percentage of independent board members (EXT). 
In the models with a qualified report as a proxy for independence, the percentage of 
independent board members increases the propensity of this type of report. Contrary to 
expectations, however, having different persons in CEO and chairman of the board positions 
negatively impacts the probability of having a qualified report. Perhaps, the influence of 
controlling shareholders in pointing out these executives could mine the expected benefits. 
These findings are not maintained in versions of the model with going concern as the dependent 
variable or in the sub-sample of qualifiable companies. 
This research contributes to the academic literature and is of interest to regulators, 
providing evidence of the relationship between the provision of NASs and the independence of 
the external auditor. 
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